viernes, 31 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 30 de mayo de 2013
miércoles, 29 de mayo de 2013
martes, 28 de mayo de 2013
lunes, 27 de mayo de 2013
domingo, 26 de mayo de 2013
viernes, 24 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 23 de mayo de 2013
miércoles, 22 de mayo de 2013
lunes, 20 de mayo de 2013
domingo, 19 de mayo de 2013
viernes, 17 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 16 de mayo de 2013
lunes, 13 de mayo de 2013
viernes, 10 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 9 de mayo de 2013
How austerity pushed american colonists to revolt
Aca
"In other words, Americans were being taxed in a currency that they didn’t control, that they didn’t possess, and were being asked to pay debts they didn’t incur."
"In other words, Americans were being taxed in a currency that they didn’t control, that they didn’t possess, and were being asked to pay debts they didn’t incur."
miércoles, 8 de mayo de 2013
The german model is not for export
Martin Wolf analiza las medidas de política de la eurozona (impulsadas por Alemania)
Gavyn Davies: The dramatic adjustment in eurozone trade imbalances
Europe's beggar-my-neighbor policy
Michael Pettis: Excess German savings, not thrift, caused the European crisis
"The European crisis, in other words, had almost nothing to do with thrifty Germans and spendthrift Spaniards. It had to do with policies aimed at boosting German employment, the secondary impact of which was to force up German national savings rates excessively. These excess savings had to be absorbed within Europe, and the subsequent imbalances were so large (because German’s savings imbalance was so large) that they led almost inevitably to the circumstances in which we are today.
For this reason the European crisis cannot be resolved except by forcing down the German savings rate. And not only must German savings rates drop, they must drop substantially, enough to give Germany a large current account deficit. This is the only way the rest of Europe can unwind the imbalances forced upon the region in a way that is least damaging to Europe as a whole. Only in this way can countries like Spain stay within the euro while bringing down unemployment.
But lower German savings don’t mean that German families should become less thrifty, only that the average German household should be allowed to retain a much larger share of what Germany produces. If Berlin were to cut consumption taxes, or cut income taxes for the lower and middle classes, or force up wages, total German consumption would rise relative to GDP and so national savings would fall – without requiring any change in the prudent behavior of German households."
Gavyn Davies: The dramatic adjustment in eurozone trade imbalances
Europe's beggar-my-neighbor policy
Michael Pettis: Excess German savings, not thrift, caused the European crisis
"The European crisis, in other words, had almost nothing to do with thrifty Germans and spendthrift Spaniards. It had to do with policies aimed at boosting German employment, the secondary impact of which was to force up German national savings rates excessively. These excess savings had to be absorbed within Europe, and the subsequent imbalances were so large (because German’s savings imbalance was so large) that they led almost inevitably to the circumstances in which we are today.
For this reason the European crisis cannot be resolved except by forcing down the German savings rate. And not only must German savings rates drop, they must drop substantially, enough to give Germany a large current account deficit. This is the only way the rest of Europe can unwind the imbalances forced upon the region in a way that is least damaging to Europe as a whole. Only in this way can countries like Spain stay within the euro while bringing down unemployment.
But lower German savings don’t mean that German families should become less thrifty, only that the average German household should be allowed to retain a much larger share of what Germany produces. If Berlin were to cut consumption taxes, or cut income taxes for the lower and middle classes, or force up wages, total German consumption would rise relative to GDP and so national savings would fall – without requiring any change in the prudent behavior of German households."
martes, 7 de mayo de 2013
What is wrong and right in economics?
Dani Rodrik
"Either you come up with a new technique or piece of evidence to shore up conventional wisdom. Or you challenge the conventional wisdom. The latter is a high risk, high return strategy. It is high risk for all the reasons I have mentioned previously. But it is high return because anything that has turned into conventional wisdom is almost by definition wrong, or at least, overstated. So done right, challenging conventional wisdom is a successful research strategy that is bound to pay off.
In my own case, every piece of conventional wisdom I challenged had already become a caricature of what sounds economics teaches us."
"Either you come up with a new technique or piece of evidence to shore up conventional wisdom. Or you challenge the conventional wisdom. The latter is a high risk, high return strategy. It is high risk for all the reasons I have mentioned previously. But it is high return because anything that has turned into conventional wisdom is almost by definition wrong, or at least, overstated. So done right, challenging conventional wisdom is a successful research strategy that is bound to pay off.
In my own case, every piece of conventional wisdom I challenged had already become a caricature of what sounds economics teaches us."
lunes, 6 de mayo de 2013
domingo, 5 de mayo de 2013
“In the long run we are all dead”: What did Keynes mean by that?
Aca
"In other words, the famous “in the long run we are all dead” statement was about the long run and short run effects as predicted by the quantity theory, not about deficit spending or Keynesian stimulus. In essence, Keynes’s passage boils down to the instability of the demand to hold money.
...
So what we have here is Keynes the quasi-monetarist advocating short-term monetarist solutions to changes in the demand to hold money. To avoid destabilising price level shocks, Keynes argued that the bank rate must be changed. The neoclassical theory held that in the long run markets would adjust and return to full employment equilibrium in response to shocks, and Keynes seems to have agreed, but – like other Marshallian neoclassicals – argued that short term pain from the destabilising forces of deflation during recessions was unnecessary and monetary interventions should be used to stabilise economies."
Matias Vernengo
Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong (y otros)
"In other words, the famous “in the long run we are all dead” statement was about the long run and short run effects as predicted by the quantity theory, not about deficit spending or Keynesian stimulus. In essence, Keynes’s passage boils down to the instability of the demand to hold money.
...
So what we have here is Keynes the quasi-monetarist advocating short-term monetarist solutions to changes in the demand to hold money. To avoid destabilising price level shocks, Keynes argued that the bank rate must be changed. The neoclassical theory held that in the long run markets would adjust and return to full employment equilibrium in response to shocks, and Keynes seems to have agreed, but – like other Marshallian neoclassicals – argued that short term pain from the destabilising forces of deflation during recessions was unnecessary and monetary interventions should be used to stabilise economies."
Matias Vernengo
Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong (y otros)
jueves, 2 de mayo de 2013
The third lever of macroeconomics
The Economist sobre política de crédito
"By credit policy (or banking policy or financial policy) I mean anything that affects how the financial system influences aggregate demand. Of course, we've always known aggregate demand depends on both the central bank’s policy rate and the spread over that rate paid by households and firms. But before the cirisis the relationship between the policy rate and what borrowers paid was assumed to be either constant, or endogenous to monetary policy or the business cycle.
That this is not always true is the greatest lesson macroeconomists have learned from the crisis."
"By credit policy (or banking policy or financial policy) I mean anything that affects how the financial system influences aggregate demand. Of course, we've always known aggregate demand depends on both the central bank’s policy rate and the spread over that rate paid by households and firms. But before the cirisis the relationship between the policy rate and what borrowers paid was assumed to be either constant, or endogenous to monetary policy or the business cycle.
That this is not always true is the greatest lesson macroeconomists have learned from the crisis."
miércoles, 1 de mayo de 2013
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