lunes, 23 de diciembre de 2013
domingo, 22 de diciembre de 2013
sábado, 21 de diciembre de 2013
jueves, 19 de diciembre de 2013
lunes, 16 de diciembre de 2013
miércoles, 11 de diciembre de 2013
Capitalism redefined
Aca
"This is why prosperity in human societies can’t be properly understood by just looking at monetary measures of income or wealth. Prosperity in a society is the accumulation of solutions to human problems."
"If the true measure of the prosperity of a society is the availability of solutions to human problems, then growth cannot simply be measured by changes in GDP. Rather, growth must be a measure of the rate at which new solutions to human problems become available."
"This is why prosperity in human societies can’t be properly understood by just looking at monetary measures of income or wealth. Prosperity in a society is the accumulation of solutions to human problems."
"If the true measure of the prosperity of a society is the availability of solutions to human problems, then growth cannot simply be measured by changes in GDP. Rather, growth must be a measure of the rate at which new solutions to human problems become available."
martes, 10 de diciembre de 2013
domingo, 8 de diciembre de 2013
viernes, 6 de diciembre de 2013
miércoles, 4 de diciembre de 2013
'Microfoundations': I do not think that word means what you think it means
Brad DeLong sobre microfundamentos
"But models with micro foundations are not of use in understanding the real economy unless you have the micro foundations right. And if you have the micro foundations wrong, all you have done is impose restrictions on yourself that prevent you from accurately fitting reality."
...
"I thought it was dangerous to presume that you understood something because you had “microfoundations” when those microfoundations were wrong."
Noah Smith reseña un debate sobre microfundamentación
Paul Krugman: Microfoundations and the parting of the waters
"But models with micro foundations are not of use in understanding the real economy unless you have the micro foundations right. And if you have the micro foundations wrong, all you have done is impose restrictions on yourself that prevent you from accurately fitting reality."
...
"I thought it was dangerous to presume that you understood something because you had “microfoundations” when those microfoundations were wrong."
Noah Smith reseña un debate sobre microfundamentación
Paul Krugman: Microfoundations and the parting of the waters
viernes, 29 de noviembre de 2013
Is QE deflationary?
Krugman (y DeLong y Rowe) contra Steve Williamson
Más de Nick Rowe
Noah Smith resume el debate
Krugman y DeLong contestan
FT Alphaville
Ryan Avent
FT Alphaville: A new good called 'security'. Otro: The repo market as a form of free banking
David Glasner: Does macroeconomics need financial foundations?. Nick Rowe le responde a Glasner
FT Alphaville: The theory of money entanglement, parte I, II y III
Safe assets and the QE enigma
Más de Nick Rowe
Noah Smith resume el debate
Krugman y DeLong contestan
FT Alphaville
Ryan Avent
FT Alphaville: A new good called 'security'. Otro: The repo market as a form of free banking
David Glasner: Does macroeconomics need financial foundations?. Nick Rowe le responde a Glasner
FT Alphaville: The theory of money entanglement, parte I, II y III
Safe assets and the QE enigma
jueves, 28 de noviembre de 2013
martes, 26 de noviembre de 2013
lunes, 25 de noviembre de 2013
jueves, 21 de noviembre de 2013
domingo, 17 de noviembre de 2013
Sobre la posibilidad de que haya un 'estancamiento secular'
Paul Krugman comenta el discurso de Larry Summers. Yves Smith le comenta a Krugman. Y Tyler Cowen
Ryan Avent también. Brad DeLong le comenta a Avent
Y Miles Kimball.
Y FT Alphaville.
Y Gavyn Davies.
Y Brad DeLong
Una crítica a todos los argumentos 'mainstream'
------------------
Lo que Krugman había dicho antes: Bubbles, regulation and secular stagnation
------------------
Olivier Blanchard: Monetary policy will never be the same again
Paul Krugman: Monetary and fiscal implications of secular stagnation
Martin Wolf: Why the future looks sluggish
Antonio Fatás: Saving glut or investment dearth?
Randall Wray
Is modern finance the source of secular stagnation?
JW Mason: Secular stagnation, progress in economics
Simon Wren-Lewis
Resumen del debate en Bruegel
De Pieria: 'Secular stagnation and post-scarcity' y 'The desert of plenty'
Columna de Brad DeLong: The long short run
Brad DeLong sobre James Pethokoukis
Brad DeLong: Is growth getting harder? If so, why, and what can we do about it? Tyler Cowen opina
Paul Krugman le echa números al debate
JW Mason: 'The interest rate and the interest rate' y 'The interest rate, the interest rate, and secular stagnation'
Ryan Avent duda de que de verdad estemos en estancamiento secular, excepto, si acaso, Alemania
Secular stagnation: Back to Alvin Hansen
Columna de Larry Summers. Brad DeLong comenta. Buttonwood opina tambien
The Economist: Why is stagnation bubbly?
Ryan Avent también. Brad DeLong le comenta a Avent
Y Miles Kimball.
Y FT Alphaville.
Y Gavyn Davies.
Y Brad DeLong
Una crítica a todos los argumentos 'mainstream'
------------------
Lo que Krugman había dicho antes: Bubbles, regulation and secular stagnation
------------------
Olivier Blanchard: Monetary policy will never be the same again
Paul Krugman: Monetary and fiscal implications of secular stagnation
Martin Wolf: Why the future looks sluggish
Antonio Fatás: Saving glut or investment dearth?
Randall Wray
Is modern finance the source of secular stagnation?
JW Mason: Secular stagnation, progress in economics
Simon Wren-Lewis
Resumen del debate en Bruegel
De Pieria: 'Secular stagnation and post-scarcity' y 'The desert of plenty'
Columna de Brad DeLong: The long short run
Brad DeLong sobre James Pethokoukis
Brad DeLong: Is growth getting harder? If so, why, and what can we do about it? Tyler Cowen opina
Paul Krugman le echa números al debate
JW Mason: 'The interest rate and the interest rate' y 'The interest rate, the interest rate, and secular stagnation'
Ryan Avent duda de que de verdad estemos en estancamiento secular, excepto, si acaso, Alemania
Secular stagnation: Back to Alvin Hansen
Columna de Larry Summers. Brad DeLong comenta. Buttonwood opina tambien
The Economist: Why is stagnation bubbly?
The future of the european periphery in the mirror of the Asian-Pacific Rim 1997-98
Brad DeLong comenta paper de Carmen Reinhart y Takeshi Tashiro
"Our old belief that you have a trend, and you calculate the trend; that you have a cycle, and you argue over whether the cycle is falls below the trend or fluctuations around it; but that you can carry this discussion along two separate and largely-disconnected tracks--that belief looks to be simply wrong."
"Our old belief that you have a trend, and you calculate the trend; that you have a cycle, and you argue over whether the cycle is falls below the trend or fluctuations around it; but that you can carry this discussion along two separate and largely-disconnected tracks--that belief looks to be simply wrong."
jueves, 14 de noviembre de 2013
miércoles, 13 de noviembre de 2013
viernes, 8 de noviembre de 2013
jueves, 7 de noviembre de 2013
martes, 5 de noviembre de 2013
viernes, 1 de noviembre de 2013
The disinflation phenomenon
The Economist
"So why haven't we had the inflation that some predicted in the wake of quantitative easing? The reason is that central banks are not the only, nor indeed the main, money creators. Money is usually created by the private banking system and that has been trying to shrink. If the money supply is a bath, then the central banks may have turned on the taps but the commercial banks have pulled out the plug."
The perils of falling inflation
"So why haven't we had the inflation that some predicted in the wake of quantitative easing? The reason is that central banks are not the only, nor indeed the main, money creators. Money is usually created by the private banking system and that has been trying to shrink. If the money supply is a bath, then the central banks may have turned on the taps but the commercial banks have pulled out the plug."
The perils of falling inflation
Crítica de EEUU a los superavits de Alemania
jueves, 31 de octubre de 2013
miércoles, 30 de octubre de 2013
martes, 29 de octubre de 2013
lunes, 28 de octubre de 2013
domingo, 27 de octubre de 2013
2/3 de la ruralidad en Colombia es colectiva
Juan Camilo Cárdenas
"En otras palabras, apenas una tercera parte del territorio rural continental y marítimo del país se podría manejar como una unidad de producción rural desde el modelo capitalista basado en la propiedad individual. El resto del país, por múltiples razones históricas, es un país de espacios colectivos donde miembros de comunidades pueden entrar y aprovechar sus recursos."
"En otras palabras, apenas una tercera parte del territorio rural continental y marítimo del país se podría manejar como una unidad de producción rural desde el modelo capitalista basado en la propiedad individual. El resto del país, por múltiples razones históricas, es un país de espacios colectivos donde miembros de comunidades pueden entrar y aprovechar sus recursos."
sábado, 26 de octubre de 2013
viernes, 25 de octubre de 2013
The best cure for "easy money" is easier monetary policy
Nick Rowe
"First off, there's a massive implicit fallacy of composition in that sort of reasoning. If you cut interest rates for one individual that individual will respond by borrowing more and spending more. But that is not how monetary policy works for an economy as a whole. Because one person's spending is another person's income. So if people spend $100 more per month then people earn $100 more income per month, so they don't need to borrow anything more in order to spend more. And it's even less true in an open economy, if a cut in interest rates causes exchange rate depreciation so foreigners spend more on Canadian goods, so Canadian net borrowing from abroad actually falls, as net exports increase.
Second off, low equilibrium interest rates are a symptom of weak demand for goods and low expected inflation. When people and firms fear continuing recession, desired investment will be low ("who will buy the extra goods we produce?"), and desired saving will be high ("what if I can't get a job?"), for any given real interest rate. So the equilibrium real interest rate will actually be lower when people and firms fear a continuing recession than when they don't. (The IS curve slopes the "wrong" way, in other words. Or the IS curve shifts left if people fear continuing recession because of overly tight monetary policy, if you prefer to think of it that way instead.)"
"First off, there's a massive implicit fallacy of composition in that sort of reasoning. If you cut interest rates for one individual that individual will respond by borrowing more and spending more. But that is not how monetary policy works for an economy as a whole. Because one person's spending is another person's income. So if people spend $100 more per month then people earn $100 more income per month, so they don't need to borrow anything more in order to spend more. And it's even less true in an open economy, if a cut in interest rates causes exchange rate depreciation so foreigners spend more on Canadian goods, so Canadian net borrowing from abroad actually falls, as net exports increase.
Second off, low equilibrium interest rates are a symptom of weak demand for goods and low expected inflation. When people and firms fear continuing recession, desired investment will be low ("who will buy the extra goods we produce?"), and desired saving will be high ("what if I can't get a job?"), for any given real interest rate. So the equilibrium real interest rate will actually be lower when people and firms fear a continuing recession than when they don't. (The IS curve slopes the "wrong" way, in other words. Or the IS curve shifts left if people fear continuing recession because of overly tight monetary policy, if you prefer to think of it that way instead.)"
jueves, 24 de octubre de 2013
Sobre comercio interregional e internacional
Paul Krugman y Ryan Avent
"Interregional trade is not Ricardian. It is instead rooted in increasing returns and the sort of intra-industry trade that was explained by Mr Krugman's new trade theory.
Rapid trade growth over the past generation ("hyperglobalisation") is a different story, however. That trade has been associated with the incorporation in the global market of very large emerging economies that do have profoundly different factor endowments from rich-world economies: most notably in their relative abundance of cheap labour.
...
Return to the example of the iPhone. Design and engineering work and the production of critical components operate in an increasing returns world. Assembly, by contrast, seems to be governed by comparative advantage.
But that's still a somewhat dissatisfying narrative. The question is: why should assembly be driven by factor abundance while design is not? It's obviously not because emerging markets can't produce sufficiently talented engineers; they do, and quite often those engineers go to Silicon Valley to work.
Mr Krugman has wrestled with these dynamics as well. Increasing returns can also generate geographic concentration. In the presence of certain positive externalities, productivity spillovers or complementarities or what have you, firms in one geographic area grow more productive as the area itself grows larger: more firms, higher productivity, more firms. So in one sense, increasing-returns-driven trade is what you get when the productivity benefits of local spillovers outweigh the potential gains from taking advantage of factor-price gaps. As the spillover benefits to bits of a supply chain erode (either because falling transport cost enable one to reap such benefits at greater distance, or because technology maturation means there is less of the tinkering and experimentation that seems to work best in clusters) those bits escape the pull of metropolitan gravity and fall toward places where the factors the bits rely on are cheapest."
"Interregional trade is not Ricardian. It is instead rooted in increasing returns and the sort of intra-industry trade that was explained by Mr Krugman's new trade theory.
Rapid trade growth over the past generation ("hyperglobalisation") is a different story, however. That trade has been associated with the incorporation in the global market of very large emerging economies that do have profoundly different factor endowments from rich-world economies: most notably in their relative abundance of cheap labour.
...
Return to the example of the iPhone. Design and engineering work and the production of critical components operate in an increasing returns world. Assembly, by contrast, seems to be governed by comparative advantage.
But that's still a somewhat dissatisfying narrative. The question is: why should assembly be driven by factor abundance while design is not? It's obviously not because emerging markets can't produce sufficiently talented engineers; they do, and quite often those engineers go to Silicon Valley to work.
Mr Krugman has wrestled with these dynamics as well. Increasing returns can also generate geographic concentration. In the presence of certain positive externalities, productivity spillovers or complementarities or what have you, firms in one geographic area grow more productive as the area itself grows larger: more firms, higher productivity, more firms. So in one sense, increasing-returns-driven trade is what you get when the productivity benefits of local spillovers outweigh the potential gains from taking advantage of factor-price gaps. As the spillover benefits to bits of a supply chain erode (either because falling transport cost enable one to reap such benefits at greater distance, or because technology maturation means there is less of the tinkering and experimentation that seems to work best in clusters) those bits escape the pull of metropolitan gravity and fall toward places where the factors the bits rely on are cheapest."
miércoles, 23 de octubre de 2013
martes, 22 de octubre de 2013
sábado, 19 de octubre de 2013
Nobel de Fama, Shiller y Hansen
Scientific background. Información básica.
Brad DeLong, con links a los posts de Tyler Cowen y Alex Tabarrok
The Economist
Tim Taylor
Paul Krugman
Justin Wolfers
Carola Binder sobre Shiller
Guan Yang sobre Hansen. Y sobre Fama aca y aca
John Cochrane sobre Fama, Hansen y Shiller. Y sobre el premio en general
Noah Smith sobre Fama y Shiller
Compilación de Mark Thoma
What the great Fama-Shiller debate has taught us
The inefficiency of the market isn't an open question
How Shiller helped Fama win the Nobel
Gavyn Davies: The Nobel Laureates on equity bubbles
Economic Prinpals
Columna de Shiller: Agreeing to disagree
Entrevista a Fama
Michael Pettis: When are markets 'rational'?
Brad DeLong, con links a los posts de Tyler Cowen y Alex Tabarrok
The Economist
Tim Taylor
Paul Krugman
Justin Wolfers
Carola Binder sobre Shiller
Guan Yang sobre Hansen. Y sobre Fama aca y aca
John Cochrane sobre Fama, Hansen y Shiller. Y sobre el premio en general
Noah Smith sobre Fama y Shiller
Compilación de Mark Thoma
What the great Fama-Shiller debate has taught us
The inefficiency of the market isn't an open question
How Shiller helped Fama win the Nobel
Gavyn Davies: The Nobel Laureates on equity bubbles
Economic Prinpals
Columna de Shiller: Agreeing to disagree
Entrevista a Fama
Michael Pettis: When are markets 'rational'?
miércoles, 16 de octubre de 2013
jueves, 19 de septiembre de 2013
Interest rates and aggregate demand
Nick Rowe
"Say's Law is false in a monetary exchange economy. In a monetary economy that produces only apples and bananas, it is perfectly possible to have an excess supply of both apples and bananas. In a monetary economy that produces only goods this year and goods next year, it is perfectly possible to have an excess supply of both goods this year and goods next year. Because there's an excess demand for money, the medium of exchange. And if that's the problem, a cut in a relative price like (Pa/Pb), or a cut in a relative price like (1+r), is not the cure."
...
But if people do not expect a return to full employment in the near future, and fear a continuing recession, the New Keynesian model might fail. A cut in real interest rates might not cure an excess supply of goods. Interest rates are the wrong thing to look at. Interest rates are a relative price that only affect relative demand, not Aggregate Demand for goods this year and goods next year."
"Say's Law is false in a monetary exchange economy. In a monetary economy that produces only apples and bananas, it is perfectly possible to have an excess supply of both apples and bananas. In a monetary economy that produces only goods this year and goods next year, it is perfectly possible to have an excess supply of both goods this year and goods next year. Because there's an excess demand for money, the medium of exchange. And if that's the problem, a cut in a relative price like (Pa/Pb), or a cut in a relative price like (1+r), is not the cure."
...
But if people do not expect a return to full employment in the near future, and fear a continuing recession, the New Keynesian model might fail. A cut in real interest rates might not cure an excess supply of goods. Interest rates are the wrong thing to look at. Interest rates are a relative price that only affect relative demand, not Aggregate Demand for goods this year and goods next year."
miércoles, 18 de septiembre de 2013
lunes, 16 de septiembre de 2013
domingo, 15 de septiembre de 2013
viernes, 13 de septiembre de 2013
miércoles, 11 de septiembre de 2013
lunes, 9 de septiembre de 2013
jueves, 5 de septiembre de 2013
miércoles, 4 de septiembre de 2013
martes, 3 de septiembre de 2013
Sobre el significado de Ronald Coase
lunes, 2 de septiembre de 2013
sábado, 31 de agosto de 2013
viernes, 30 de agosto de 2013
martes, 27 de agosto de 2013
domingo, 25 de agosto de 2013
jueves, 22 de agosto de 2013
miércoles, 21 de agosto de 2013
martes, 20 de agosto de 2013
lunes, 19 de agosto de 2013
viernes, 16 de agosto de 2013
Nuevo debate sobre la importancia de los bancos en la macro
Paul Krugman. Cullen Roche le responde. Roche otra vez. Krugman responde
Comentario sobre la discusión
A bank is not a financial intermediary. Concerted Action comenta
Matt Klein critica a Robert Hall sobre las reservas de los bancos. Paul Krugman comenta
Interfluidity
Otra vez Cullen Roche
Concerted Action
Krugman and Tobin on banking
Más del paper de Tobin
Bank lending and bank reserves
JP Koning
Nick Rowe
Otro de Nick Rowe: The two James Tobins. There's only one James Tobin, dice Scott Sumner
How quickly does a hot potato get cold? Moving the endogenous money debate on
A bank is not a financial intermediary. Concerted Action comenta
Matt Klein critica a Robert Hall sobre las reservas de los bancos. Paul Krugman comenta
Interfluidity
Otra vez Cullen Roche
Concerted Action
Krugman and Tobin on banking
Más del paper de Tobin
Bank lending and bank reserves
JP Koning
Nick Rowe
Otro de Nick Rowe: The two James Tobins. There's only one James Tobin, dice Scott Sumner
How quickly does a hot potato get cold? Moving the endogenous money debate on
jueves, 15 de agosto de 2013
miércoles, 14 de agosto de 2013
martes, 13 de agosto de 2013
lunes, 12 de agosto de 2013
viernes, 9 de agosto de 2013
jueves, 8 de agosto de 2013
miércoles, 7 de agosto de 2013
martes, 6 de agosto de 2013
lunes, 5 de agosto de 2013
viernes, 2 de agosto de 2013
jueves, 1 de agosto de 2013
miércoles, 31 de julio de 2013
martes, 30 de julio de 2013
lunes, 29 de julio de 2013
domingo, 28 de julio de 2013
sábado, 27 de julio de 2013
jueves, 25 de julio de 2013
miércoles, 24 de julio de 2013
lunes, 22 de julio de 2013
viernes, 19 de julio de 2013
martes, 16 de julio de 2013
lunes, 15 de julio de 2013
jueves, 11 de julio de 2013
miércoles, 10 de julio de 2013
sábado, 6 de julio de 2013
jueves, 4 de julio de 2013
miércoles, 3 de julio de 2013
domingo, 30 de junio de 2013
sábado, 29 de junio de 2013
viernes, 28 de junio de 2013
miércoles, 26 de junio de 2013
martes, 25 de junio de 2013
lunes, 24 de junio de 2013
viernes, 21 de junio de 2013
jueves, 20 de junio de 2013
Sobre la reducción de QE3
Ryan Avent
Calculated Risk
Matt O'Brien
FT Alphaville
David Glasner
Stephen Williamson
Tim Duy sobre el disenso de Bullard
James Hamilton: The end of low interest rates
Unwinding the world's biggest economic experiment
Entrevista con James Bullard
Scott Sumner vs Evan Soltas
Ryan Avent: Whose low rates are these?
"But the point of QE, in a broader sense, is that other things will not remain equal. Low interest rates are supposed to discourage saving and encourage borrowing and investing, adding to overall economic demand. That, in turn, should raise expected inflation, should raise the expected path of short-run real rates, and should reduce demand for safe assets. So QE should hold down interest rates relative to a baseline level reflective of broader conditions, which should then rise as a result. Effective QE could then produce a pattern of falling rates giving way to rising rates. Or it could produce a muddle. And the expected end of QE could produce similarly confusing price moves."
Mike Konkzal: Que era más importante de QE3, las compras o el guidance?
The all-powerful Fed
Barry Eichengreen cree que la crisis fue por el 'credit crunch' de China
Minutas de la reunión de la Fed. Comentarios de Tim Duy y FT Alphaville
Traders vs economists
Blogs review: The Bernanke doctrine and the separation between forward guidance and tapering
Calculated Risk
Matt O'Brien
FT Alphaville
David Glasner
Stephen Williamson
Tim Duy sobre el disenso de Bullard
James Hamilton: The end of low interest rates
Unwinding the world's biggest economic experiment
Entrevista con James Bullard
Scott Sumner vs Evan Soltas
Ryan Avent: Whose low rates are these?
"But the point of QE, in a broader sense, is that other things will not remain equal. Low interest rates are supposed to discourage saving and encourage borrowing and investing, adding to overall economic demand. That, in turn, should raise expected inflation, should raise the expected path of short-run real rates, and should reduce demand for safe assets. So QE should hold down interest rates relative to a baseline level reflective of broader conditions, which should then rise as a result. Effective QE could then produce a pattern of falling rates giving way to rising rates. Or it could produce a muddle. And the expected end of QE could produce similarly confusing price moves."
Mike Konkzal: Que era más importante de QE3, las compras o el guidance?
The all-powerful Fed
Barry Eichengreen cree que la crisis fue por el 'credit crunch' de China
Minutas de la reunión de la Fed. Comentarios de Tim Duy y FT Alphaville
Traders vs economists
Blogs review: The Bernanke doctrine and the separation between forward guidance and tapering
martes, 18 de junio de 2013
lunes, 17 de junio de 2013
viernes, 14 de junio de 2013
martes, 11 de junio de 2013
Martin Wolf y FT Alphaville sobre el mecanismo de transmisión monetaria
Martin Wolf: The overstated inflation danger:
"Could the 2020s see an inflationary upsurge? Many believe so because there is a direct link – the so-called “money multiplier” – between the reserves of commercial banks held at the central bank and the lending by commercial banks to the public. They assume banks will lend more against these reserves, meaning that the current high level of reserves at the central bank is an indicator of future monetary expansion.
But a solvent bank can obtain the reserves it needs from the central bank. Moreover, the central bank will make sure that such a bank never falls short of reserves, since the alternative could well be a breakdown of the payment system. So what limits banks’ lending? The answer is: its own solvency and that of its customers.
So the equity capital of the bank is, accordingly, a far more important determinant of its ability to create money than its reserves. Moreover, should the central bank wish to lower excess bank reserves, it can either sell government debt to the public or raise their reserve requirements. Thus, the idea that a high level of reserves guarantees a future surge in broad money is false." FT Alphaville: When money multipliers become divisors
"Could the 2020s see an inflationary upsurge? Many believe so because there is a direct link – the so-called “money multiplier” – between the reserves of commercial banks held at the central bank and the lending by commercial banks to the public. They assume banks will lend more against these reserves, meaning that the current high level of reserves at the central bank is an indicator of future monetary expansion.
But a solvent bank can obtain the reserves it needs from the central bank. Moreover, the central bank will make sure that such a bank never falls short of reserves, since the alternative could well be a breakdown of the payment system. So what limits banks’ lending? The answer is: its own solvency and that of its customers.
So the equity capital of the bank is, accordingly, a far more important determinant of its ability to create money than its reserves. Moreover, should the central bank wish to lower excess bank reserves, it can either sell government debt to the public or raise their reserve requirements. Thus, the idea that a high level of reserves guarantees a future surge in broad money is false." FT Alphaville: When money multipliers become divisors
jueves, 6 de junio de 2013
miércoles, 5 de junio de 2013
Inflación de bienes vs inflación de servicios
Ryan Avent
"More simply, services inflation is about expectations and unemployment, while goods inflation is about global capacity utilisation. That makes sense; to a first approximation services are people. Goods are also people, a little bit. But they are more energy, materials, and supply chains. Goods prices rise faster when one of those three factors bumps up against constraints. Service prices rise faster when there aren't enough people to go around.
...
I like this way of digging into CPI data. But I also think it mostly reinforces the point that what monetary policy is really interested in is the labour-market output gap and its relation to wage growth. The prices for "stuff" don't matter, and we don't care if factories or stores close so long as everyone who wants to work can. The goods-services distinction is useful in that it shows us once again that on that basis the Fed has done far too little."
"More simply, services inflation is about expectations and unemployment, while goods inflation is about global capacity utilisation. That makes sense; to a first approximation services are people. Goods are also people, a little bit. But they are more energy, materials, and supply chains. Goods prices rise faster when one of those three factors bumps up against constraints. Service prices rise faster when there aren't enough people to go around.
...
I like this way of digging into CPI data. But I also think it mostly reinforces the point that what monetary policy is really interested in is the labour-market output gap and its relation to wage growth. The prices for "stuff" don't matter, and we don't care if factories or stores close so long as everyone who wants to work can. The goods-services distinction is useful in that it shows us once again that on that basis the Fed has done far too little."
martes, 4 de junio de 2013
Brad DeLong sobre los motores de crecimiento del futuro
Aca
"Social science having to do with the economy is about trying to track the emergent property that arise from the fact that we as a world have decided to organize our extraordinarily productive and diverse 7.3-billion human global division of labour largely through decentralized market exchange, mediated by firms that are islands of hierarchy and bureaucracy swimming in a larger market-oriented albeit government-regulated sea.
It is clear to everyone who tries to do this seriously that figuring out what the emergent properties of this complicated decentralized systems are hinges on the details of the institutions: productive, organizational, and regulatory details matter and matter a lot. There is a very narrow limit to what you can do that is useful by following in the hyper-abstract footprints of David Ricardo. To say anything real, you have to say what’s going on in the industry.
All of you here are the people who understand what the institutional, organizational and regulatory details are, and thus have a chance of accurately determining what the interesting emergent properties are. You are the useful point of the spear. Too many of your colleagues in the social sciences are performing the equivalents of medieval scholastic theology precisely because they lack institutional knowledge of the details. Thus they write about the emergent properties of some other system, but not those of this system that we have here and now."
"Social science having to do with the economy is about trying to track the emergent property that arise from the fact that we as a world have decided to organize our extraordinarily productive and diverse 7.3-billion human global division of labour largely through decentralized market exchange, mediated by firms that are islands of hierarchy and bureaucracy swimming in a larger market-oriented albeit government-regulated sea.
It is clear to everyone who tries to do this seriously that figuring out what the emergent properties of this complicated decentralized systems are hinges on the details of the institutions: productive, organizational, and regulatory details matter and matter a lot. There is a very narrow limit to what you can do that is useful by following in the hyper-abstract footprints of David Ricardo. To say anything real, you have to say what’s going on in the industry.
All of you here are the people who understand what the institutional, organizational and regulatory details are, and thus have a chance of accurately determining what the interesting emergent properties are. You are the useful point of the spear. Too many of your colleagues in the social sciences are performing the equivalents of medieval scholastic theology precisely because they lack institutional knowledge of the details. Thus they write about the emergent properties of some other system, but not those of this system that we have here and now."
lunes, 3 de junio de 2013
viernes, 31 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 30 de mayo de 2013
miércoles, 29 de mayo de 2013
martes, 28 de mayo de 2013
lunes, 27 de mayo de 2013
domingo, 26 de mayo de 2013
viernes, 24 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 23 de mayo de 2013
miércoles, 22 de mayo de 2013
lunes, 20 de mayo de 2013
domingo, 19 de mayo de 2013
viernes, 17 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 16 de mayo de 2013
lunes, 13 de mayo de 2013
viernes, 10 de mayo de 2013
jueves, 9 de mayo de 2013
How austerity pushed american colonists to revolt
Aca
"In other words, Americans were being taxed in a currency that they didn’t control, that they didn’t possess, and were being asked to pay debts they didn’t incur."
"In other words, Americans were being taxed in a currency that they didn’t control, that they didn’t possess, and were being asked to pay debts they didn’t incur."
miércoles, 8 de mayo de 2013
The german model is not for export
Martin Wolf analiza las medidas de política de la eurozona (impulsadas por Alemania)
Gavyn Davies: The dramatic adjustment in eurozone trade imbalances
Europe's beggar-my-neighbor policy
Michael Pettis: Excess German savings, not thrift, caused the European crisis
"The European crisis, in other words, had almost nothing to do with thrifty Germans and spendthrift Spaniards. It had to do with policies aimed at boosting German employment, the secondary impact of which was to force up German national savings rates excessively. These excess savings had to be absorbed within Europe, and the subsequent imbalances were so large (because German’s savings imbalance was so large) that they led almost inevitably to the circumstances in which we are today.
For this reason the European crisis cannot be resolved except by forcing down the German savings rate. And not only must German savings rates drop, they must drop substantially, enough to give Germany a large current account deficit. This is the only way the rest of Europe can unwind the imbalances forced upon the region in a way that is least damaging to Europe as a whole. Only in this way can countries like Spain stay within the euro while bringing down unemployment.
But lower German savings don’t mean that German families should become less thrifty, only that the average German household should be allowed to retain a much larger share of what Germany produces. If Berlin were to cut consumption taxes, or cut income taxes for the lower and middle classes, or force up wages, total German consumption would rise relative to GDP and so national savings would fall – without requiring any change in the prudent behavior of German households."
Gavyn Davies: The dramatic adjustment in eurozone trade imbalances
Europe's beggar-my-neighbor policy
Michael Pettis: Excess German savings, not thrift, caused the European crisis
"The European crisis, in other words, had almost nothing to do with thrifty Germans and spendthrift Spaniards. It had to do with policies aimed at boosting German employment, the secondary impact of which was to force up German national savings rates excessively. These excess savings had to be absorbed within Europe, and the subsequent imbalances were so large (because German’s savings imbalance was so large) that they led almost inevitably to the circumstances in which we are today.
For this reason the European crisis cannot be resolved except by forcing down the German savings rate. And not only must German savings rates drop, they must drop substantially, enough to give Germany a large current account deficit. This is the only way the rest of Europe can unwind the imbalances forced upon the region in a way that is least damaging to Europe as a whole. Only in this way can countries like Spain stay within the euro while bringing down unemployment.
But lower German savings don’t mean that German families should become less thrifty, only that the average German household should be allowed to retain a much larger share of what Germany produces. If Berlin were to cut consumption taxes, or cut income taxes for the lower and middle classes, or force up wages, total German consumption would rise relative to GDP and so national savings would fall – without requiring any change in the prudent behavior of German households."
martes, 7 de mayo de 2013
What is wrong and right in economics?
Dani Rodrik
"Either you come up with a new technique or piece of evidence to shore up conventional wisdom. Or you challenge the conventional wisdom. The latter is a high risk, high return strategy. It is high risk for all the reasons I have mentioned previously. But it is high return because anything that has turned into conventional wisdom is almost by definition wrong, or at least, overstated. So done right, challenging conventional wisdom is a successful research strategy that is bound to pay off.
In my own case, every piece of conventional wisdom I challenged had already become a caricature of what sounds economics teaches us."
"Either you come up with a new technique or piece of evidence to shore up conventional wisdom. Or you challenge the conventional wisdom. The latter is a high risk, high return strategy. It is high risk for all the reasons I have mentioned previously. But it is high return because anything that has turned into conventional wisdom is almost by definition wrong, or at least, overstated. So done right, challenging conventional wisdom is a successful research strategy that is bound to pay off.
In my own case, every piece of conventional wisdom I challenged had already become a caricature of what sounds economics teaches us."
lunes, 6 de mayo de 2013
domingo, 5 de mayo de 2013
“In the long run we are all dead”: What did Keynes mean by that?
Aca
"In other words, the famous “in the long run we are all dead” statement was about the long run and short run effects as predicted by the quantity theory, not about deficit spending or Keynesian stimulus. In essence, Keynes’s passage boils down to the instability of the demand to hold money.
...
So what we have here is Keynes the quasi-monetarist advocating short-term monetarist solutions to changes in the demand to hold money. To avoid destabilising price level shocks, Keynes argued that the bank rate must be changed. The neoclassical theory held that in the long run markets would adjust and return to full employment equilibrium in response to shocks, and Keynes seems to have agreed, but – like other Marshallian neoclassicals – argued that short term pain from the destabilising forces of deflation during recessions was unnecessary and monetary interventions should be used to stabilise economies."
Matias Vernengo
Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong (y otros)
"In other words, the famous “in the long run we are all dead” statement was about the long run and short run effects as predicted by the quantity theory, not about deficit spending or Keynesian stimulus. In essence, Keynes’s passage boils down to the instability of the demand to hold money.
...
So what we have here is Keynes the quasi-monetarist advocating short-term monetarist solutions to changes in the demand to hold money. To avoid destabilising price level shocks, Keynes argued that the bank rate must be changed. The neoclassical theory held that in the long run markets would adjust and return to full employment equilibrium in response to shocks, and Keynes seems to have agreed, but – like other Marshallian neoclassicals – argued that short term pain from the destabilising forces of deflation during recessions was unnecessary and monetary interventions should be used to stabilise economies."
Matias Vernengo
Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong (y otros)
jueves, 2 de mayo de 2013
The third lever of macroeconomics
The Economist sobre política de crédito
"By credit policy (or banking policy or financial policy) I mean anything that affects how the financial system influences aggregate demand. Of course, we've always known aggregate demand depends on both the central bank’s policy rate and the spread over that rate paid by households and firms. But before the cirisis the relationship between the policy rate and what borrowers paid was assumed to be either constant, or endogenous to monetary policy or the business cycle.
That this is not always true is the greatest lesson macroeconomists have learned from the crisis."
"By credit policy (or banking policy or financial policy) I mean anything that affects how the financial system influences aggregate demand. Of course, we've always known aggregate demand depends on both the central bank’s policy rate and the spread over that rate paid by households and firms. But before the cirisis the relationship between the policy rate and what borrowers paid was assumed to be either constant, or endogenous to monetary policy or the business cycle.
That this is not always true is the greatest lesson macroeconomists have learned from the crisis."
miércoles, 1 de mayo de 2013
martes, 30 de abril de 2013
lunes, 29 de abril de 2013
domingo, 28 de abril de 2013
viernes, 26 de abril de 2013
miércoles, 24 de abril de 2013
martes, 23 de abril de 2013
lunes, 22 de abril de 2013
viernes, 19 de abril de 2013
jueves, 18 de abril de 2013
Loanable funds and liquidity preference; DeLong vs. Fama
Nick Rowe
"We live in an economy with monetary exchange (not barter). The very concept of "aggregate demand" only makes sense in a monetary economy, because it refers to the monetary demand for goods. To get an increased demand for goods, in terms of money, somewhere along the causal chain you need an excess supply of money. The initial excess demand for loans causes a rise in the rate of interest (loanable funds theory). The rise in the rate of interest causes an excess supply of money (liquidity preference theory). The excess supply of money is either spent, and so creates an increased demand for goods directly; or (more likely), is lent, and so creates an increased supply of loans and investment, and so creates an increased demand for goods indirectly."
"We live in an economy with monetary exchange (not barter). The very concept of "aggregate demand" only makes sense in a monetary economy, because it refers to the monetary demand for goods. To get an increased demand for goods, in terms of money, somewhere along the causal chain you need an excess supply of money. The initial excess demand for loans causes a rise in the rate of interest (loanable funds theory). The rise in the rate of interest causes an excess supply of money (liquidity preference theory). The excess supply of money is either spent, and so creates an increased demand for goods directly; or (more likely), is lent, and so creates an increased supply of loans and investment, and so creates an increased demand for goods indirectly."
martes, 16 de abril de 2013
Reinhart Rogoff resultó falso
Mike Konczal
Mark Thoma
Cullen Roche
Paul Krugman
Tyler Cowen
FT Alphaville
Respuesta de Reinhart y Rogoff. Krugman comenta la respuesta
Randall Wray
Matt O'Brien
Noah Smith
Respuesta más completa de Reinhart y Rogoff
Owen Zidar
Josh Barro
Más reacciones
The Economist
La causalidad sí parece ser la inversa a la sostenida por Reinhart y Rogoff
Otra crítica (vieja) a Reinhart-Rogoff: A World Upside Down?: Deficit Fantasies in the Great Recession
Otro de Krugman
James Kwak
Compilación de Bruegel
Gavyn Davies
Brad DeLong
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Más de James Kwak
Krugman otra vez. Y otro
James Hamilton. Pollin y Ash contestan. Hamilton otra vez
Ryan Avent
Arvind Subramanian
Ryan Avent y Martin Wolf
Mike Konczal evalúa el debate
Otro de Krugman
James Hamilton: The contributions of Reinhart and Rogoff
Brad DeLong: Risks of debt
Justin Wolfers y Betsey Stevenson
Otros alumnos critican a Reinhart y Rogoff
Ricardo Hausman (y crítica de Matias Vernengo)
Krugman otra vez
Resumen de David Warsh
New Economic Perspectives. Otro
Dean Baker y Larry Summers
Carta de Reinhart y Rogoff a Krugman. James Hamilton comenta. Y Brad DeLong. Y Ryan Avent. Paul Krugman contesta
Miles Kimball y Yichuan Yuang: High debt does not slow growth. Más de Miles Kimball. Otro de Kimball y Yuang
Mark Thoma
Cullen Roche
Paul Krugman
Tyler Cowen
FT Alphaville
Respuesta de Reinhart y Rogoff. Krugman comenta la respuesta
Randall Wray
Matt O'Brien
Noah Smith
Respuesta más completa de Reinhart y Rogoff
Owen Zidar
Josh Barro
Más reacciones
The Economist
La causalidad sí parece ser la inversa a la sostenida por Reinhart y Rogoff
Otra crítica (vieja) a Reinhart-Rogoff: A World Upside Down?: Deficit Fantasies in the Great Recession
Otro de Krugman
James Kwak
Compilación de Bruegel
Gavyn Davies
Brad DeLong
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Más de James Kwak
Krugman otra vez. Y otro
James Hamilton. Pollin y Ash contestan. Hamilton otra vez
Ryan Avent
Arvind Subramanian
Ryan Avent y Martin Wolf
Mike Konczal evalúa el debate
Otro de Krugman
James Hamilton: The contributions of Reinhart and Rogoff
Brad DeLong: Risks of debt
Justin Wolfers y Betsey Stevenson
Otros alumnos critican a Reinhart y Rogoff
Ricardo Hausman (y crítica de Matias Vernengo)
Krugman otra vez
Resumen de David Warsh
New Economic Perspectives. Otro
Dean Baker y Larry Summers
Carta de Reinhart y Rogoff a Krugman. James Hamilton comenta. Y Brad DeLong. Y Ryan Avent. Paul Krugman contesta
Miles Kimball y Yichuan Yuang: High debt does not slow growth. Más de Miles Kimball. Otro de Kimball y Yuang
lunes, 15 de abril de 2013
viernes, 12 de abril de 2013
El problema de la tasa de interés es que está muy alta o muy baja?
miércoles, 10 de abril de 2013
martes, 9 de abril de 2013
lunes, 8 de abril de 2013
domingo, 7 de abril de 2013
jueves, 4 de abril de 2013
El nuevo QE en Japón (Abenomics)
El FT explica de que se trata. Y aca
FT Alphaville
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Matt O'Brien
Noah Smith
Buttonwood
FT Alphaville
Tyler Cowen
Martin Wolf
La inspiración para política actual del BOJ viene de 1930
Scott Sumner: Japan: So far so good but not enough
Tim Duy: What does Japan mean for the rest of the world?
Nick Rowe, Paul Krugman Noah Smith y otros sobre los propósitos de Abenomics. Brad DeLong también
The secret of Abenomics by David Beckworth and Lars Christensen
FT Alphaville
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Matt O'Brien
Noah Smith
Buttonwood
FT Alphaville
Tyler Cowen
Martin Wolf
La inspiración para política actual del BOJ viene de 1930
Scott Sumner: Japan: So far so good but not enough
Tim Duy: What does Japan mean for the rest of the world?
Nick Rowe, Paul Krugman Noah Smith y otros sobre los propósitos de Abenomics. Brad DeLong también
The secret of Abenomics by David Beckworth and Lars Christensen
miércoles, 3 de abril de 2013
martes, 2 de abril de 2013
lunes, 1 de abril de 2013
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