jueves, 31 de enero de 2013
miércoles, 30 de enero de 2013
martes, 29 de enero de 2013
domingo, 27 de enero de 2013
viernes, 25 de enero de 2013
jueves, 24 de enero de 2013
A brief history of macroeconomics
martes, 22 de enero de 2013
viernes, 18 de enero de 2013
jueves, 17 de enero de 2013
miércoles, 16 de enero de 2013
martes, 15 de enero de 2013
lunes, 14 de enero de 2013
Safe assets and the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy
Tim Duy. Más de Duy
Interfluidity: There's no such thing as base money anymore. Krugman responde. Tim Duy también. Cullen Roche le responde a Krugman
De nuevo Interfluidity. Y Krugman responde. Scott Sumner cree que Krugman tiene razon
Cullen Roche
Interfluidity otra vez
... Y Scott Sumner
Base money basics
Nick Rowe
Tim Duy
David Beckworth
FT Alphaville
Y otra vez Krugman
Understanding the permanent floor — An important inconsistency in neoclassical monetary economics
Cullen Roche
Scott Sumner
Interfluidity otra vez
Nick Rowe: Two extreme fiscal/monetary worlds
De nuevo Interfluidity. Y Krugman responde. Scott Sumner cree que Krugman tiene razon
Cullen Roche
Interfluidity otra vez
... Y Scott Sumner
Base money basics
Nick Rowe
Tim Duy
David Beckworth
FT Alphaville
Y otra vez Krugman
Understanding the permanent floor — An important inconsistency in neoclassical monetary economics
Cullen Roche
Scott Sumner
Interfluidity otra vez
Nick Rowe: Two extreme fiscal/monetary worlds
viernes, 11 de enero de 2013
jueves, 10 de enero de 2013
martes, 8 de enero de 2013
lunes, 7 de enero de 2013
The most dangerous idea in Federal Reserve history
Paper de Romer y Romer
"The most dangerous idea, they say, is excessive pessimism about monetary policy. If you look back at the two key eras where we say monetary policy went awry—during the deflation of the 1930s and the inflation of the 1970s—the interesting thing that Romer and Romer find is that if you dig into the archives of the Federal Reserve minutes there weren't really "mistakes" as you might think of it. Policymakers in the '30s knew there was a deflationary slump, and they knew it was bad, just as policymakers in the '70s knew there was an inflationary spiral, and they knew it was bad. But in the '30s, policymakers persuaded themselves that with interest rates already low there was nothing more they could do, while policymakers in the '70s persuaded themselves that inflation represented a purely structural phenomenon that they couldn't cure."
"The most dangerous idea, they say, is excessive pessimism about monetary policy. If you look back at the two key eras where we say monetary policy went awry—during the deflation of the 1930s and the inflation of the 1970s—the interesting thing that Romer and Romer find is that if you dig into the archives of the Federal Reserve minutes there weren't really "mistakes" as you might think of it. Policymakers in the '30s knew there was a deflationary slump, and they knew it was bad, just as policymakers in the '70s knew there was an inflationary spiral, and they knew it was bad. But in the '30s, policymakers persuaded themselves that with interest rates already low there was nothing more they could do, while policymakers in the '70s persuaded themselves that inflation represented a purely structural phenomenon that they couldn't cure."
La economía y los mercados financieros están inextricablemente ligados
Aca
"The old view of economics and finance was that, except perhaps for a few exceptions like major bubbles, the real economy was the dog and the financial economy was the tail--and the tail couldn't wag the dog. But trying to study the problems of the modern world economy without taking finance into account would be incomprehensible."
"The old view of economics and finance was that, except perhaps for a few exceptions like major bubbles, the real economy was the dog and the financial economy was the tail--and the tail couldn't wag the dog. But trying to study the problems of the modern world economy without taking finance into account would be incomprehensible."
The Economist sobre safe assets
Aca
"The useful justification for fiscal deficits at a time of recession is the Keynesian one of supporting demand. But in the current crisis, one could argue that governments were simply providing a service - supplying a sufficient quantity of safe assets to meet the demands of investors."
"As the monetary system evolved, the currency guarantor function of the central banks changed with it. The Bank no longer had to worry about having enough gold but it did have to worry about having enough foreign exchange reserves to safeguard the currency against speculative attacks, something the Bank of England failed to do in 1992. The introduction of inflation targeting turned the Bank from the guarantor of the external value of the currency to the guarantor of its internal value. And, of course, some central banks (including the Fed) target economic growth as well as inflation."
"In practice, safe assets are defined in a more technical sense, as those assets that institutions are allowed to treat as safe for accounting or regulatory purposes. Governments can act like Captain Jean-Luc Picard shouting "Make it so" and decree that their own debt be treated as safe. This is, arguably, an even greater power than the ability to tax which is limited by the exigencies of electoral politics and the realities of mobile international capital and labour."
Y sobre la demanda por títulos de deuda pública
The safe asset shortage. Comentario de David Beckworth: Resolving the safe asset shortage problem
JW Mason
The Economist le responde a David Beckworth
Simon Wren-Lewis
JP Koning duda de la teoría de la escasez de safe assets. David Beckworth le responde
Beckworth otra vez
Brad DeLong sobre safe assets
Otra vez The Economist
"The useful justification for fiscal deficits at a time of recession is the Keynesian one of supporting demand. But in the current crisis, one could argue that governments were simply providing a service - supplying a sufficient quantity of safe assets to meet the demands of investors."
"As the monetary system evolved, the currency guarantor function of the central banks changed with it. The Bank no longer had to worry about having enough gold but it did have to worry about having enough foreign exchange reserves to safeguard the currency against speculative attacks, something the Bank of England failed to do in 1992. The introduction of inflation targeting turned the Bank from the guarantor of the external value of the currency to the guarantor of its internal value. And, of course, some central banks (including the Fed) target economic growth as well as inflation."
"In practice, safe assets are defined in a more technical sense, as those assets that institutions are allowed to treat as safe for accounting or regulatory purposes. Governments can act like Captain Jean-Luc Picard shouting "Make it so" and decree that their own debt be treated as safe. This is, arguably, an even greater power than the ability to tax which is limited by the exigencies of electoral politics and the realities of mobile international capital and labour."
Y sobre la demanda por títulos de deuda pública
The safe asset shortage. Comentario de David Beckworth: Resolving the safe asset shortage problem
JW Mason
The Economist le responde a David Beckworth
Simon Wren-Lewis
JP Koning duda de la teoría de la escasez de safe assets. David Beckworth le responde
Beckworth otra vez
Brad DeLong sobre safe assets
Otra vez The Economist
domingo, 6 de enero de 2013
sábado, 5 de enero de 2013
viernes, 4 de enero de 2013
Quantitative easing doesn't lower interest rates. It raises them.
Matt O'Brien
"Things will begin to make more sense once you realize monetary policy is more about expectations than interest rates. The latter just tell us about the former, especially when it comes to quantitative easing. Remember, buying bonds should lower interest rates, but it doesn't when it's the Fed doing the buying. It doesn't because the Fed isn't really buying bonds as much as it's sending a message that it wants more growth."
"Things will begin to make more sense once you realize monetary policy is more about expectations than interest rates. The latter just tell us about the former, especially when it comes to quantitative easing. Remember, buying bonds should lower interest rates, but it doesn't when it's the Fed doing the buying. It doesn't because the Fed isn't really buying bonds as much as it's sending a message that it wants more growth."
Sobre la reciente política económica de Japón
Tim Duy
Paul Krugman aca y aca. Scott Sumner comenta
Màs de Krugman
The Economist. Correccion y ampliacion de The Economist
Lars Christensen
Krugman: No esperamos alza en las tasas de largo plazo por mayores expectativas de inflaciòn
Màs de Krugman sobre Japon
Martin Wolf: The risky task of relaunching Japan
Paul Krugman aca y aca. Scott Sumner comenta
Màs de Krugman
The Economist. Correccion y ampliacion de The Economist
Lars Christensen
Krugman: No esperamos alza en las tasas de largo plazo por mayores expectativas de inflaciòn
Màs de Krugman sobre Japon
Martin Wolf: The risky task of relaunching Japan
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