David Simon sobre 'the two Americas'

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Sobre los usos de la economía en Google

Artículo en Wired

Bibliografía de economía de Greg Ip

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The ticking time bomb in bond funds

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Sobre la posible burbuja en los bonos

Sobre la revoluciòn del 'shale gas'

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Insolvency is philosophy, illiquidity is fact

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A postmodern economy

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Cost of food as catalyst for change cannot be ignored

Aca "One of the elements often overlooked is the heavy reliance on both energy and water in the production and availability of food. Food production is largely agriculture – which requires land, energy, water, and chemicals for fertilizer. Food availability, on the other hand, encompasses ports and shipping, rail systems, trucking, refrigeration, warehousing, storage, supermarkets, packaging (more chemicals), transporting consumers to and from markets, home refrigeration and, particularly in developed countries, a huge amount of waste disposal. The movement of food from farm to market to shopper is a major consumer of energy but those energy costs are not captured in the price of the food on our shelves. As we run out of arable land this will change, prices will rise and cities must become part of the solution."

Europe needs to drop its resistance to non bank credit

Aca

The financial systems in the United States and Europe have long differed on an important aspect. In Europe, most of the credit flows through the banks. In the United States the bank channel is less dominant, and borrowers gain access to capital directly by issuing bonds or through “non-bank” intermediaries that do not take deposits and are not regulated as banks. An oft-quoted measure is that in Europe banks represent more than two-thirds of total credit, whereas in the United States the proportion is less than one-third. In the past few years of crisis, this difference has mattered decisively.

To begin with, the securitization of residential mortgages in the United States went wild in the mid-2000s and was the initial trigger of market turmoil in the summer of 2007. Many continental Europeans have concluded that their bank-based system was less risky or more virtuous. But the subprime securitization debacle, severe as it was, has been one part of a more complex story. Many European banks have made risk-management mistakes just as massive as the reviled originators of US securitization deals. Spanish or Irish banks anticipating a never-ending property boom, or failures such as Dexia in France and Belgium, Hypo Real Estate or WestLB in Germany, or RBS in the United Kingdom, are sad reminders that Europeans have no grounds to feel complacent about their own system.