Cambios en Basilea III

Aca

Why banks shouldn't trade

Felix Salmon

Living cells show how to fix the financial system

Aca

"Hierarchy, in other words, is a way of limiting complexity in the interest of both stability and evolvability. Simon argued that systems structured in this way possess a basic, competitive simplicity"

"...Bone, like most other structures in biology, is not just complex, but complex in a highly organized way. What about structures in economics and finance? "

"The growth of modern finance seems to have violated the principle of hierarchical structures, and with gusto. Two trends in the past 30 years -- the merging of banks into huge institutions and the explosion of derivatives that link them around the globe -- have made the network much less modular. We have created a vast web of interconnections with extreme complexity but little organization. And this does appear to have made the system less resilient."

El paper de Herbert Simon

Regulatory reform since the financial crisis

Discurso de Dan Tarullo

"The New Deal reforms, engrafted onto preexisting restrictions in the National Bank Act and state banking laws, largely confined commercial banks to traditional lending activities within a circumscribed geographic area, while protecting them from runs and panics through the provision of federal deposit insurance and Federal Reserve discount window access. At the same time, investment banks and broker-dealers were essentially prohibited from affiliation with traditional banks. This approach fostered a system that was, for the better part of 40 years, very stable and reasonably profitable, though not particularly innovative in meeting the needs of savers, on the one hand, and of households and businesses wishing to borrow funds, on the other.

Beginning in the 1970s, the separation of traditional lending and capital markets activities began to break down under the weight of macroeconomic turbulence, technological and business innovation, and competition. The dominant trend of the next 30 years was the progressive integration of these activities, fueling the expansion of what has become known as the shadow banking system, including the explosive growth of securitization and derivative instruments in the first decade of this century.

This trend entailed two major, and related, changes. First, it diminished the importance of deposits as a source of funding for credit intermediation in favor of capital market instruments sold to institutional investors. Over time, these markets began to serve some of the same maturity transformation functions as the traditional banking systems, which in turn led to both an expansion and alteration of traditional money markets. Ultimately, there was a vast increase in the creation of so-called cash equivalent instruments, which were supposedly safe, short-term, and liquid. Second, this trend altered the structure of the industry, both transforming the activities of broker-dealers and fostering the emergence of large financial conglomerates.

Though motivated in part by regulatory arbitrage, these developments were driven by more than regulatory evasion: Such factors as the growth and deepening of capital markets and the rise of institutional investors as guardians of household savings accelerated the fracturing of the system established in 1933. Whatever the relative importance of these causal factors, however, one thing is clear: Neither the statutory framework for, nor supervisory oversight of, the financial system adapted to take account of the new risks posed by the broader trend. On the contrary, regulatory change for the 30 years preceding the crisis was largely a deregulatory program, designed at least in part to address the erosion of banks’ franchise value caused by the rapid growth of credit intermediation through capital markets."

Beyond the Minsky moment: Where we’ve been, why we can’t go back, and the road ahead for rinancial reform

Ebook del Levy Institute

Rethinking Basel

Alternativas a Basilea

Financial stability in emerging markets: Dealing with global liquidity

Simposio

The future of banking

Ebook

Liquidity, bank capital and market reform

Aca

Independent Bankig Commission de Inglaterra

El reporte. Comentarios de The Economist. 1 y 2

Un comentario

Sobre Basilea III

Críticas

'Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and Back Again'

Discurso de Mervyn King. The Economist comenta

'The Resilience Stability Tradeoff: Drawing Analogies between River Flood Management and Macroeconomic Management'

Post

'A macroprudential approach to financial regulation'

Paper

The Economist

Costos y beneficios de la liberalizacion financiera

Discurso del Chairman de la FSA

Restringir, o no restringir los flujos de capital

El FMI solía apoyar la no restricción. Ahora ha cambiado de opinión

Jagdish Bhagwati y Dan Tarullo dicen (en 2003) que no se deben restringir

Artículo en The Economist

Sobre control de capitales y tratados de inversión

Debate sobre el control de flujos de capital en el FT

Varios economistas apoyan los controles de capital

The Economist pregunta

The Economist

The Economist a propósito de la turbulencia por la reducción del QE