Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Crisis de deuda. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Crisis de deuda. Mostrar todas las entradas
lunes, 13 de mayo de 2013
miércoles, 8 de mayo de 2013
The german model is not for export
Martin Wolf analiza las medidas de política de la eurozona (impulsadas por Alemania)
Gavyn Davies: The dramatic adjustment in eurozone trade imbalances
Europe's beggar-my-neighbor policy
Michael Pettis: Excess German savings, not thrift, caused the European crisis
"The European crisis, in other words, had almost nothing to do with thrifty Germans and spendthrift Spaniards. It had to do with policies aimed at boosting German employment, the secondary impact of which was to force up German national savings rates excessively. These excess savings had to be absorbed within Europe, and the subsequent imbalances were so large (because German’s savings imbalance was so large) that they led almost inevitably to the circumstances in which we are today.
For this reason the European crisis cannot be resolved except by forcing down the German savings rate. And not only must German savings rates drop, they must drop substantially, enough to give Germany a large current account deficit. This is the only way the rest of Europe can unwind the imbalances forced upon the region in a way that is least damaging to Europe as a whole. Only in this way can countries like Spain stay within the euro while bringing down unemployment.
But lower German savings don’t mean that German families should become less thrifty, only that the average German household should be allowed to retain a much larger share of what Germany produces. If Berlin were to cut consumption taxes, or cut income taxes for the lower and middle classes, or force up wages, total German consumption would rise relative to GDP and so national savings would fall – without requiring any change in the prudent behavior of German households."
Gavyn Davies: The dramatic adjustment in eurozone trade imbalances
Europe's beggar-my-neighbor policy
Michael Pettis: Excess German savings, not thrift, caused the European crisis
"The European crisis, in other words, had almost nothing to do with thrifty Germans and spendthrift Spaniards. It had to do with policies aimed at boosting German employment, the secondary impact of which was to force up German national savings rates excessively. These excess savings had to be absorbed within Europe, and the subsequent imbalances were so large (because German’s savings imbalance was so large) that they led almost inevitably to the circumstances in which we are today.
For this reason the European crisis cannot be resolved except by forcing down the German savings rate. And not only must German savings rates drop, they must drop substantially, enough to give Germany a large current account deficit. This is the only way the rest of Europe can unwind the imbalances forced upon the region in a way that is least damaging to Europe as a whole. Only in this way can countries like Spain stay within the euro while bringing down unemployment.
But lower German savings don’t mean that German families should become less thrifty, only that the average German household should be allowed to retain a much larger share of what Germany produces. If Berlin were to cut consumption taxes, or cut income taxes for the lower and middle classes, or force up wages, total German consumption would rise relative to GDP and so national savings would fall – without requiring any change in the prudent behavior of German households."
martes, 16 de abril de 2013
Reinhart Rogoff resultó falso
Mike Konczal
Mark Thoma
Cullen Roche
Paul Krugman
Tyler Cowen
FT Alphaville
Respuesta de Reinhart y Rogoff. Krugman comenta la respuesta
Randall Wray
Matt O'Brien
Noah Smith
Respuesta más completa de Reinhart y Rogoff
Owen Zidar
Josh Barro
Más reacciones
The Economist
La causalidad sí parece ser la inversa a la sostenida por Reinhart y Rogoff
Otra crítica (vieja) a Reinhart-Rogoff: A World Upside Down?: Deficit Fantasies in the Great Recession
Otro de Krugman
James Kwak
Compilación de Bruegel
Gavyn Davies
Brad DeLong
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Más de James Kwak
Krugman otra vez. Y otro
James Hamilton. Pollin y Ash contestan. Hamilton otra vez
Ryan Avent
Arvind Subramanian
Ryan Avent y Martin Wolf
Mike Konczal evalúa el debate
Otro de Krugman
James Hamilton: The contributions of Reinhart and Rogoff
Brad DeLong: Risks of debt
Justin Wolfers y Betsey Stevenson
Otros alumnos critican a Reinhart y Rogoff
Ricardo Hausman (y crítica de Matias Vernengo)
Krugman otra vez
Resumen de David Warsh
New Economic Perspectives. Otro
Dean Baker y Larry Summers
Carta de Reinhart y Rogoff a Krugman. James Hamilton comenta. Y Brad DeLong. Y Ryan Avent. Paul Krugman contesta
Miles Kimball y Yichuan Yuang: High debt does not slow growth. Más de Miles Kimball. Otro de Kimball y Yuang
Mark Thoma
Cullen Roche
Paul Krugman
Tyler Cowen
FT Alphaville
Respuesta de Reinhart y Rogoff. Krugman comenta la respuesta
Randall Wray
Matt O'Brien
Noah Smith
Respuesta más completa de Reinhart y Rogoff
Owen Zidar
Josh Barro
Más reacciones
The Economist
La causalidad sí parece ser la inversa a la sostenida por Reinhart y Rogoff
Otra crítica (vieja) a Reinhart-Rogoff: A World Upside Down?: Deficit Fantasies in the Great Recession
Otro de Krugman
James Kwak
Compilación de Bruegel
Gavyn Davies
Brad DeLong
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Más de James Kwak
Krugman otra vez. Y otro
James Hamilton. Pollin y Ash contestan. Hamilton otra vez
Ryan Avent
Arvind Subramanian
Ryan Avent y Martin Wolf
Mike Konczal evalúa el debate
Otro de Krugman
James Hamilton: The contributions of Reinhart and Rogoff
Brad DeLong: Risks of debt
Justin Wolfers y Betsey Stevenson
Otros alumnos critican a Reinhart y Rogoff
Ricardo Hausman (y crítica de Matias Vernengo)
Krugman otra vez
Resumen de David Warsh
New Economic Perspectives. Otro
Dean Baker y Larry Summers
Carta de Reinhart y Rogoff a Krugman. James Hamilton comenta. Y Brad DeLong. Y Ryan Avent. Paul Krugman contesta
Miles Kimball y Yichuan Yuang: High debt does not slow growth. Más de Miles Kimball. Otro de Kimball y Yuang
miércoles, 3 de abril de 2013
sábado, 27 de octubre de 2012
domingo, 22 de julio de 2012
jueves, 26 de abril de 2012
Why does Uncle Sam borrow?
Aca
"I wish to make a radical suggestion: Public borrowing is an outdated practice, and we could dispense with it entirely. Borrowing by the public treasury and the accumulation of government debt obligations are legacies of the era that preceded the development of modern fiat currency, an era when governments were primarily users of traditional means of payment that lay outside their control, and not the producers and issuers of the primary means of payment."
viernes, 23 de marzo de 2012
lunes, 27 de febrero de 2012
miércoles, 22 de febrero de 2012
jueves, 16 de febrero de 2012
NGDP y la deuda publica
Scott Sumner
"Government debt is nominal debt, not indexed to inflation. That means the debt /GDP ratio is the ratio of debt to NGDP, not RGDP. Maybe that’s obvious, but most of the time when the media refers to “GDP” they mean real GDP"
"Government debt is nominal debt, not indexed to inflation. That means the debt /GDP ratio is the ratio of debt to NGDP, not RGDP. Maybe that’s obvious, but most of the time when the media refers to “GDP” they mean real GDP"
lunes, 13 de febrero de 2012
miércoles, 8 de febrero de 2012
miércoles, 1 de febrero de 2012
sábado, 28 de enero de 2012
jueves, 19 de enero de 2012
viernes, 23 de diciembre de 2011
jueves, 22 de diciembre de 2011
jueves, 15 de diciembre de 2011
martes, 29 de noviembre de 2011
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